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Abstract: Gridlock in the multilateral climate negotiations has created growing scholarly 
and practical interest in the use of minilateral forums. A large variety of climate club 
proposals have been developed in recent years, which promise more effective bargaining 
among the main climate powers, better incentives to encourage mitigation efforts and 
discourage free-riding, and new ways to align international power asymmetries with the 
interests of the global climate regime. This paper investigates the three dominant 
rationales that underpin minilateralist proposals. It offers a critical review of their 
potential as well as limitations in promoting global climate action. It argues that 
minilateralism is unlikely to overcome the structural barriers to a comprehensive and 
ambitious international climate agreement. However, climate clubs can enhance political 
dialogue in the context multilateral negotiations and provide a more conducive 
environment for great power bargaining. They can create club benefits that strengthen 
mitigation strategies and help reduce the dangers of free-riding for so-called coalitions of 
the willing. And they can help re-legitimate the global climate regime against the 
background of profound power shifts that have slowed down progress in the multilateral 
negotiations.  
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1. Introduction 
	
Despite over two decades of multilateral negotiations, international society has yet to 
produce an effective response to the threat of global warming. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), so far the 
only legally binding treaty with specific emission reduction targets, has proved to be 
ineffective. As expectations for the 2015 Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in 
Paris have been scaled back, many observers question whether the multilateral process 
can ever produce an effective international response. More and more analysts now argue 
that UNFCCC-style multilateralism needs to be replaced, or at least augmented, with a 
new form of climate minilateralism. David Victor, for example, hails “the practical 
benefits that arise from crafting agreements around the core interests of a smaller number 
of countries”.3 Moisés Naím warns against “a flawed obsession with multilateralism as the 
panacea for all the world’s ills” and advocates “a smarter, more targeted approach” in the 
form of a minilateral club.4 Anthony Brenton calls for a small group of “Climate Great 
Powers” to work together to explore bargaining solutions that are unavailable in the 
multilateral setting.5 Likewise, William Antholis and Strobe Talbott, William Nordhaus, 
Anthony Giddens and Robyn Eckersley propose the creation of climate clubs comprising 
a small number of key players that hold the key to finding a global solution.6 Timmons 
Roberts may be overstating the case when he describes the idea of climate minlateralism 
as “practically conventional wisdom in developed countries”,7 but it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that a discursive shift has occurred that has moved great power minilateralism 
from the margins to the centre of the debate on international climate politics. At the 
same time, minilateralist proposals remain deeply controversial in global politics and 
provoke strong reactions particularly in developing countries that fear being excluded 
from the negotiation process. Both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the international 
climate process are therefore at stake in this debate.  
 Climate change is not the only area of global concern in which established 
multilateral processes have failed to produce the required level of international 
	 3 
cooperation. Political scientists warn of increasing gridlock in global governance across a 
number of international policy arenas, from financial regulation to nuclear non-
proliferation and public health.8 In the environmental field, evidence is mounting that 
humanity is unable to provide adequate policy responses to resource scarcity, degradation 
of ecosystems and the reduction of the planet’s ability to absorb waste and pollution. The 
magnitude of the global challenge is illustrated by what scientists have recently coined the 
advent of the “Anthropocene”, a geological era in which human activities rival global 
geophysical forces in shaping the planet.9 As the Anthropocene unfolds and business-as-
usual trends are pushing us against global planetary boundaries, the limitations of 
conventional top-down approaches in international governance are becoming 
increasingly apparent. And as Debra Javeline has recently argued, political scientists need 
to consider not only how to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions but also how to reduce 
humanity’s “vulnerability to the now inevitable impacts of climate change”.10 
In response to the apparent failure of climate multilateralism, scholars have 
proposed several forms of innovation in global governance, from bottom-up policy 
processes and experimentalist governance to transnational regime complexes and multi-
actor governance networks.11 Minilateralism is but one, albeit important, variant of 
global governance innovation. Its attraction lies not least in the fact that it works with the 
grain of international politics and merely seeks to modify existing processes of 
international cooperation. Writing in this journal, for example, Robert Keohane and 
Victor advocate building “parallel club-oriented regimes as part of a regime complex” 
rather than negotiating a “comprehensive, integrated regime”.12 By creatively reshaping 
the composition of international forums to better reflect global power realities, 
minilateralism thus promises a more realistic scenario for developing global policy 
responses. 
If indeed an “effective architecture of governance system for planetary 
stewardship is likely to be polycentric and multi-level rather than centralized and 
hierarchical”13, as Will Steffen et al. suggest, then political science research needs to focus 
on whether and how such novel governance approaches can be made to work at the 
global level. The debate on polycentric governance, originally developed for local and 
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national contexts, has only begun to address this question of global effectiveness.14 This 
article aims to make a contribution to this debate in two ways. First, it develops a more 
fine-grained understanding of how minilateralism is meant to promote global climate 
mitigation, by separating out the different theoretical rationales behind club-based 
solutions. Second, by subjecting each of these rationales to critical examination, it injects 
a greater sense of realism into the debate and identifies those areas in which club-based 
approaches can indeed make a meaningful contribution. Using insights from 
international relations theories, the article maps out a research agenda on how to turn 
minilateral clubs into realistic tools for global governance innovation without falling prey 
to hubristic expectations.  
The analysis unfolds in four steps. The second section provides a brief review of 
the recent debate on climate minilateralism, highlighting the different models that have 
been put forward and identifying the functions they are intended to serve. The 
subsequent three sections then examine in more detail how convincing the rationales 
behind each minilateral model are: the notion that small-n negotiation groups are more 
likely to reach an international compromise on climate mitigation by improving 
bargaining efficiency (section 3); the idea that climate clubs can change the underlying 
interest structure in international climate politics by creating club benefits and enforcing 
club rules (section 4); and the argument that a minilateral forum can re-legitimate the 
multilateral climate regime by empowering the great powers while establishing their 
special climate responsibilities and tying the club into the multilateral framework (section 
5). The final section sums up the argument and proposes an agenda for future research. It 
argues that, while minilateralism is unlikely to overcome the structural barriers to a 
comprehensive and ambitious international agreement, it can nevertheless serve certain 
limited purposes: climate clubs can enhance political dialogue in the context multilateral 
negotiations and provide a more conducive environment for great power bargaining; they 
can create club benefits that strengthen mitigation strategies and reduce free-riding, but 
only for so-called coalitions of the willing; and they can help re-legitimate the global 
climate regime against the background of profound power shifts that have slowed down 
progress in the multilateral negotiations.  
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2. A review of minilateralist proposals 
 
A growing number of analysts have advocated a minilateral solution to the problem of 
climate change. Closer analysis of these proposals reveals that there are in fact not one but 
several different minilateral models. These models vary in important ways, with regard to 
questions of club size and membership, purpose and function, and legitimacy and inter-
regime linkages. As I argue in this section, these variations reflect not just minor 
differences in regime design but contrasting theoretial rationales for climate 
minilateralism. 
 Most minilateralist arguments take as their starting point the assumption that the 
unequal distribution of power is an inescapable fact of international life, and that if 
lasting international cooperation is to be achieved then the process of negotiating 
international agreements must in some way reflect this power asymmetry. This is a 
central point in Miles Kahler’s classic definition of minilateralism as a “system of 
governance through great power collaboration”.15 However, it is far from obvious how 
club size and membership should be determined in the case of climate change. In fact, 
existing proposals range from twenty to just two members. Naim assumes that the 
number should be “about 20” which would account for between 75% and 80% of global 
emissions.16 Others believe the right number is between twelve and twenty,17 with some 
proposing the seventeen-strong Major Economies Forum (MEF) as the appropriate 
institution.18 Todd Stern and Antholis advocate a much smaller setting, an “E8” similar 
to the G7 or G8 meetings.19 Brenton likewise identifies eight states as “climate great 
powers”.20 Yet others argue for even smaller clubs, ranging from seven21 to six22 and four23 
or even just two – a G-2 composed of the United States and China.24  
 Why is there no straightforward answer to the question of club size? After all, 
most proposals tend to agree that climate minilateralism should be built around a “club 
of the relevant”25, consisting of the major emitters that possess economic weight as well as 
political influence, and whose support is essential to an effective agreement.26 Such 
definitions of ‘relevance’ usually revolve around a critical mass approach, which focuses 
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on countries that have significant veto power and the capability to contribute to 
collective problem-solving. If we focus on a country’s share of global emissions, share of 
global GDP, and share of global population as proxy indicators for ‘relevance’, then 
China, the United States, the European Union, Russia and India are in the top ten 
according to all three indicators. Japan, Canada and Brazil make it into the top ten with 
regard to two indicators, while Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mexico and Australia are in the top ten according to just one 
indicator.27 Clearly, the question of ‘climate power’ status is intimately tied to the 
question of how we define ‘relevance’ in climate politics. 
 A variant of this club model, which is based on considerations of legitimacy in 
addition to those of veto power and capability, includes a mix of major emitters, major 
economies and those countries most at risk from climate change – “the most capable, the 
most responsible and the most vulnerable”.28 Furthermore, if a climate club is defined 
not by veto power but by the level of ambition, then membership rules become even 
more fluid. Minilateral forums could become trend-setters in international climate policy 
if they are built around “coalitions of the willing”.29 By excluding laggards with veto 
power, a “transformational climate club”30 composed of environmentally progressive 
countries could create club benefits that would encourage others to join and gradually 
enlarge the circle of members as the level of ambition rises. Finally, some models that 
focus on problem-solving capacity go even further and propose to extend the club model 
beyond the inter-governmental realm by including non-state actors, in particular 
corporations that possess the capacity to advance global mitigation efforts in specific 
sectors.31  In the latter case, minilateralism becomes an even more flexible tool of 
polycentric governance, involving state and nonstate actors and operating at transnational 
and regional levels.32 
 It is clear from this brief review that the design of club size and membership is 
closely related to what a climate club is meant to achieve. On this question, three 
different types of minilateral functions can be distinguished, and it makes sense to 
structure our analysis around these three minilateralist rationales. The first is about 
enhancing political dialogue and bargaining. A minilateral forum achieves this by 
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allowing the major emitters to discuss climate policy informally, away from official 
multilateral negotiations. Such a dialogue forum would enable the political leaders of the 
major emitters to build mutual trust and explore how to find common ground without 
the expectation of reaching a formal agreement, much like in the G-8 or G-20.33 For this, 
club membership would be restricted to the great powers, but could vary depending on 
the specific focus of the political dialogue. Alternatively, the minilateral club could be the 
main forum for full-scale negotiations. In order to lower the transaction costs of 
bargaining and reduce the severity of interest asymmetries among great powers, the 
number of club members would need to be kept to a minimum.34 Naim calls this 
minilateralism’s “magic number”, or “the smallest possible number of countries needed 
to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem”.35 
 A second climate club model goes beyond deliberation and bargaining and aims 
at the creation of membership-specific incentives that encourage compliance with climate 
agreements. Based on economic theories of cooperation,36 the minilateral forum would 
be structured to create specific benefits that can be limited to those countries that are 
willing to join the institution and abide by its rules.37 It could establish mechanisms for 
enforcing its rules and agreements, mainly by imposing sanctions on non-compliant 
members but potentially also to target non-members with a view to incentivizing them to 
join the club. Accordingly, the composition of the club would vary depending on the 
underlying interest structure and the ability of its members to create club benefits. 
Importantly, as club size affects countries’ willingness to pay for club benefits, the 
number of countries that decide to join the climate club would have an important 
influence over the bargaining dynamics within the club.38 
 A third model of minilateralism sees the climate club as a tool for legitimating 
great power cooperation in the context of the existing multilateral regime. Creating a 
formally established climate club would acknowledge the underlying reality of great 
power politics and grant special rights to the great powers (so-called great power 
prerogatives) while tying them to the multilateral process. By creating a formal link 
between the club and the multilateral regime, this model seeks to reduce the risk of 
fragmentation and destabilization that comes with a proliferation of small-n forums. It is 
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concerned with legitimating the inevitable practice of informal great power cooperation 
as a stepping stone towards more a comprehensive multilateral agreement, which in turn 
would help re-legitimate the multilateral regime in the eyes of the great powers 
themselves. In this model, membership in the club and institutional links to the 
UNFCCC would need to be designed to achieve small-n bargaining efficiency while 
retaining sufficient representation by less powerful members of the climate regime.39 
  As has become clear in this brief review, we are dealing with not one but at least 
three different minilateral approaches to solving the global climate problem. Which of 
these can hope to make a meaningful contribution to the global mitigation challenge? In 
the remainder of this article, I consider each model in turn and apply insights from 
international relations theories to identify a realistic scenario for climate clubs as part of 
global climate governance. As I shall argue, minilateralism offers no panacea for the ills of 
climate multilateralism, but a carefully crafted club solution holds the promise of moving 
us beyond the current state of multilateral gridlock. 
 
3. Bargaining efficiency  
 
Rationalist theories of international relations that focus on the distribution of national 
interests and the bargaining context in which countries pursue their interests have been at 
the forefront of developing minilateralist proposals. Their starting point is the widely 
shared observation that UNFCCC-style multilateralism is cumbersome, inefficient and 
slow. Universal emancipation in the negotiations empowers too many countries that have 
no interest in a workable compromise and produces outcomes that reflect the lowest 
common denominator.40 In their view, Olson’s famous dictum that “the larger the group, 
the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good” sums up 
what is wrong with climate multilateralism.41 Creating international co-operation on 
emissions reductions is a costly global collective good, with not enough major powers 
willing to pay for its provision. Unless the major polluters’ interests change, something 
else has to change to improve the provision of the collective good: the bargaining process. 
One conclusion that rationalists draw from this analysis is that a shift of the negotations 
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towards a minilateral forum would improve the efficiency of the bargaining context and 
promote a more meaningful international agreement.  
	 The ‘k-group’ approach to international bargaining captures the logic of this 
argument.42 Small groups of countries find it easier to reach agreements than large-n 
settings, mainly because fewer countries’ interests and circumstances need to be taken 
into account, fewer bilateral and plurilateral side-deals need to be struck, and linkage 
politics can be used in a more targeted way. Furthermore, where club-based negotiations 
take place behind closed doors and away from the glare of the world’s media, trust is 
more likely to be built between the club members, and the temptation for negotiators to 
pander and posture is reduced.43 This is what happened in the early phase of the post-
1945 trade talks. The GATT started out as a small club of major economies that 
negotiated a succession of trade liberalization agreements. The small number of players in 
the early GATT rounds reduced the complexity of reciprocal deals, and conducting the 
talks far from the limelight of public scrutiny helped to insulate the negotiations from 
protectionist interests.44 In short, reducing the number of players and creating an 
exclusive bargaining environment increases the efficiency of negotiations and boosts the 
chances of finding a compromise agreement.  
There is some evidence that the k-group logic can make a difference in 
international climate politics. Minilateralists point to the experience of the Copenhagen 
conference of 2009, where two weeks of painstaking multilateral negotiations failed to 
deliver the long-awaited global climate treaty. It was only at the end of the conference, 
when a small group of world leaders came together in a more informal setting, away from 
the strictures of the UNFCCC process, that progress was made. Heads of state from the 
most important emitter countries, including the US, China and India, were able to agree 
on the Copenhagen Accord, a short political statement that was later integrated into the 
UNFCCC agreements and paved the way for the Durban Platform on Enhanced 
Action.45 The small group that achieved this outcome had no formal mandate or status 
within the UNFCCC. Formed spontaneously on a self-selecting basis, it comprised the 
leading emitters with veto power in climate politics.   
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But could such a k-group approach provide the breakthrough in future climate 
negotiations that the world has been waiting for? The experience with the Copenhagen 
Conference is instructive in this regard. The Copenhagen Accord is a political agreement 
short on detail and precision, laying out basic principles for how future negotiations are 
to advance the goal of climate mitigation. It succeeded precisely because it sidestepped 
some of the more difficult issues, especially the distribution of the mitigation burden 
between the main emitters. Where the interests of the great powers are too diverse and 
domestic support for strong international action too weak, changes to the bargaining 
process alone cannot hope to overcome those barriers, especially when it comes to 
distributional conflicts. The comparison with trade negotiations – often cited by 
minilateralists – is also instructive here. In the GATT’s early days the main powers of 
North America and Europe achieved landmark deals based on a series of minilateral 
bargains. They were able to establish a rules-based regime, reduce tariffs across different 
sectors and agree certain national exemptions and flexibility clauses to bridge diverging 
national interests. But such compromises were possible in the GATT because the key 
countries bargained not just over the distribution of the costs of policy adjustment – they 
were also set to derive short and medium term gains from mutually agreed trade 
liberalization. The GATT negotiations succeeded because they were able to turn trade 
liberalisation into a (at least partially) private good that the members of the club could 
appropriate. 
In contrast, the climate negotiations are set up primarily to focus on the 
distribution of mitigation burdens, with few if any economic gains on the table, at least 
in the short to medium term. In a situation where the main interest of a significant 
number of great powers lies in resisting costly policy measures to reduce emissions, 
shifting the negotiations to a minilateral forum will do little to induce a change in the 
interest calculus of major emitters. As some minilateralists acknowledge,46 a climate club 
that includes most major emitters would face the same structural impediments to a global 
mitigation agreement that have plagued the UNFCCC negotiations. Only by excluding 
reluctant veto players and constructing the club as a ‘coalition of the willing’ could 
interest divergence be reduced enough to facilitate a mitigation agreement. This would, 
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however, reduce the overall impact of such an agreement on global emissions, thereby 
limiting its environmental effectiveness. 
This is not to say that minilateral forums cannot make a meaningful contribution 
to international climate policy. Even if they do not alter individual country positions in 
any substantial way, they can still provide a useful opportunity for great power dialogue 
that can inject political momentum into the multilateral negotiations. Indeed, some of 
the main emitters have repeatedly sought to engage such small-n forums to build broad 
coalitions around their preferred climate policy initiatives. The European countries 
repeatedly put climate change on the agenda of the G-8, at the Gleneagles summit in 
2005 and again at the Heiligendamm summit in 2007, while the United States preferred 
to work through its own minilateral institution, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate (APP). To be sure, neither of these institutions produced any 
breakthrough results, and some were seen as potential distractions from multilateral 
negotiations, or forum-shifting, as was the case with the APP. Indeed, as will be discussed 
below, such forums are still plagued by questions of procedural legitimacy, though they 
are increasingly welcomed by the leading emitters as more flexible means to explore 
opportunities for agreement in the UNFCCC and beyond. Talk may be cheap, but it 
remains an essential mode of diplomacy, especially in the field of climate change. 
 
4. Club benefits 
 
The second rationale that rationalist theories of International Relations put forward for a 
minilateral approach is focused on the ability of minilateral forums to change interest 
structures. Rather than merely altering the bargaining process, climate clubs are expected 
to create incentives for states to join clubs and abide by their rules. By changing the way 
individual countries calculate their national interest, minilateralism is expected to become 
a transformative institution that tackles the structural barriers to strong mitigation 
agreements.    
 Analysts of international climate politics have long argued that one of the key 
shortcomings of the climate regime is the absence of international mechanisms that 
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encourage compliance and deter free riding.47 For as long as international climate politics 
aims at producing a global public good in the form of coordinated emission reduction by 
all major emitters, the supply of such a public good will be insufficient. What is needed, 
therefore, is a change in the nature of international cooperation. Instead of aiming for 
near-universal membership in a broad mitigation agreement, climate politics needs to 
redefine climate protection as a quasi-private good. A minilateral club is needed to 
produce this shift, as it allows for the creation of club benefits that are restricted to those 
countries willing to abide by its rules. In theory, climate minilateralism thus offers three 
advantages over a multilateral approach: it allows climate leaders to go ahead with more 
ambitious mitigation policies without waiting for laggards to agree to the collective effort; 
it creates benefits from emission reductions that encourage countries to join the club, 
thereby enlarging the scope of the agreement over time; and it enables the club to enforce 
commitments as membership in the club can be suspended and benefits can be 
withdrawn. In this way, minilateralism seeks to change international climate politics from 
a lowest-common-denominator logic towards a more de-centralised game of ratcheting 
up mitigation efforts.   
 Proponents of this approach draw inspiration from the experience with post-
1945 trade liberalization talks. The GATT started out as a club of 23 founding countries 
that grew into a near-universal trade organization with 161 members (as of April 2015). 
Operating as a relatively small club of like-minded advanced economies, the GATT 
achieved rapid reductions in trade tariffs in its early days, with a quick succession of five 
trade rounds in its first twenty years. Membership grew slowly but steadily during this 
period, and the coverage of trade issues expanded as well, especially with the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round in 1994.48 The GATT integration process was driven initially by 
the United States as the world’s leading economy in the immediate postwar era, and later 
through a form of collective leadership by the US, Europe and Japan. The club nature of 
the GATT allowed the trade regime to create specific benefits to members that were 
unavailable to non-members, such as market access, lower tariffs, and use of a dispute 
settlement mechanism. In this way, club-based cooperation changed states’ incentive 
structure to favour reciprocal trade liberalization, mainly because the GATT’s exclusion 
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mechanism turned free trade into a private good. Even if the gradual expansion of free 
trade through GATT rounds ended up producing side benefits for non-members and the 
global economy as a whole,49 the discrete benefits to individual countries arising from 
GATT membership were large enough to incentivize a growing number to join the club 
and abide by its rules.50  
 How could a similar approach be applied to climate politics? The fundamental 
dilemma of international climate cooperation is that the public good nature of mitigation 
efforts creates pervasive free-riding incentives, thereby undercutting countries’ willingness 
to contribute to the mitigation effort. Any country trying to reduce its own emissions 
faces costs that it has to shoulder in the short run. However, the benefits that it produces, 
in the form of global climate stabilization, materialize in the long run and are non-
excludable. In the absence of a multilateral climate regime that enforces national 
mitigation commitments, the only way to change this incentive structure is either to 
reduce the national costs of climate mitigation or to turn mitigation benefits from a 
public into a private good, or both. Minilateralism is meant to achieve this by creating 
club arrangements that pool the mitigation cost among a small group of countries and 
create excludable club benefits from their cooperation.  
 The benefits of club-based international cooperation are usually based on 
preferential access to certain economic gains, in the form of finance, trade, investment or 
technology. In the case of climate change, this could involve granting club members 
preferential access to climate finance, e.g. through grants or loans for investments in 
emission-reducing technologies; it could be based on a scheme to share proprietary low-
carbon technologies at no cost or at below-market rates; or it could lead to collective 
mitigation efforts based on sectoral agreements or regional emission trading schemes that 
lower the costs of mitigation.51 Clubs may also need to impose sanctions on members to 
encourage compliance and deter free riding. This usually takes the form of exclusion 
from the club, withdrawal of certain membership rights, trade discrimination or financial 
penalties. In the case of a climate club, non-compliant members could face the 
withdrawal of club benefits such as access to climate finance and technology sharing, or 
the imposition of carbon tariffs on their exports. In principle, any such benefits could be 
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created in a large-n multilateral setting, too, but where interest diversity and free-riding 
incentives are high, as in climate change, the advantages of operating in a small-n 
environment are overwhelming: producing benefits and imposing sanctions is less costly, 
and bargaining over rules is less complex, if club membership is small. 
 How convincing is this minilateralist logic? In assessing the viability of climate 
clubs, it is important to consider the different ways in which they are expected to change 
countries’ incentives.  
 The first transformation that a climate club may aim at is to make international 
action to protect the climate an excludable (private) good, so that membership in the 
club becomes valuable to major emitters. Because of the transboundary nature of the 
climate problem, climate mitigation itself can never be constructed as a private good. The 
reduction of emissions in any country or group of countries will always benefit the world 
collectively, and no country can be excluded from global climate stabilization. The only 
way to get around this is to focus on international cooperation that involves climate 
mitigation as a side effect but is valuable to countries for other reasons. Such non-climate 
benefits include energy efficiency gains or technological innovation and diffusion 
(Stewart et al 2013, 365). To be sure, where such opportunities for mutually beneficial 
cooperation exist, rational actors should pursue them in any case – adding climate 
mitigation into the mix merely strengthens the rationale for creating such clubs. Recent 
research suggests that climate mitigation increasingly offers net benefits to countries 
undertaking investments in low-carbon solutions.52 But realizing the opportunities for 
mutually beneficial arrangements will be difficult for several reasons. For one, the global 
governance of energy is highly fragmented and hindered by competing policy 
objectives.53 Despite the recent creation of the International Renewable Energy Agency, 54 
international cooperation on energy efficiency and green technology has a poor track 
record. The Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP), so far the only major experiment to create a 
club focused on energy efficiency and climate protection, offers some insights in this 
regard. Initiated by the Bush Administration as an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol, the 
APP was disbanded after only five years in operation and has had little discernible impact 
on emission trends.55 The initiative was widely perceived to be a laggards’ club, with key 
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countries (USA, Australia, Canada) led by governments that were skeptical about the 
need for urgent climate action. In other words, the APP offered a suitable forum for 
action, but lacked political will to make a difference. A minilateral forum makes little 
difference if it is not led by ambitious countries with sufficient economic and political 
clout.  
Furthermore, even if a more lasting and dynamic clean energy or green 
technology club can be created, it is far from clear whether such cooperation would help 
reduce emissions as a side-benefit. The mitigation potential of low-carbon technologies 
depends on overcoming a complex web of economic, political, regulatory and societal 
barriers, most of which are located at the national level.56 International cooperation can 
provide a more supportive environment for low-carbon transformations, e.g. by pooling 
research funding or promoting technology diffusion, but the critical bottlenecks are to be 
found in the domestic realm. Energy or technology clubs that depend on positive 
externalities to reduce emissions are therefore bound to be an unrealiable and 
unpredictable instrument for climate mitigation. There are good reasons to pursue 
collective gains from cooperation on energy efficiency and green technology, but it is 
unrealistic to expect non-climate benefits from club cooperation to play a major role in 
driving global mitigation strategies. 
 The second club strategy for changing countries’ incentives is based on the 
provision of financial transfers. Paying other countries to increase environmental 
protection is a common feature in international environmental politics. Several 
multilateral regimes rely on aid mechanisms to increase participation and compliance, 
and the UNFCCC itself uses several such funding mechanisms to promote climate 
mitigation and adaptation (Global Environment Facility, Adaptation Fund, Clean 
Development Mechanism). To be effective, such aid mechanisms depend on a high level 
of environmental concern among donor countries and the capacity to absorb aid and 
reduce environmental degradation among recipient countries. For this reason, 
international environmental aid has usually flown from the North to the South, and 
mostly to emerging economies with large populations.57 The same has been the case with 
climate funding through the Clean Development Mechanism, which has benefitted 
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primarily China, India, Brazil, South Korea and Mexico.58 However, climate aid flows 
have had a negligible effect on global emissions so far and have failed to stem the rising 
tide of emissions from emerging economies. Channeling such transfers through smaller 
clubs could provide an attractive option for better targeting aid. But it is unlikely that 
environmental concern will be high enough among donor countries to pay for significant 
mitigation efforts in the largest emitters from the Global South, which are also major 
economic competitors. Financial transfers may play a small role in the global mitigation 
effort, but the leading global emitters will have to finance the bulk of emission reductions 
themselves.  
 The third club strategy involves sanctions to reduce the risk of free riding. They 
can be imposed on existing members if they fail to comply with club rules or used against 
non-members in order to induce them to join the club. In both cases, the sanctions need 
to be costly enough to alter the target country’s interest calculation, which usually 
requires trade restrictions in one form or the other. Proponents of such an approach 
point to the use of trade restrictions in the Montreal Protocol, which are widely held to 
have ensured high levels of compliance and attracted near-universal participation.59 In his 
proposal for a climate club, Nordhaus discusses carbon-specific tariffs or a uniform tariff 
on imports from non-members as the best way for club members to ensure that others 
will want to join the collective mitigation effort.60 Economic calculations of the required 
tariff suggest that it would be within a reasonable range – Nordhaus arrives at a 2 percent 
universal tariff.   
However, this club logic ignores two important political barriers that make it an 
unrealistic tool for building an effective climate club. First, it is far from clear that non-
members would choose to join a climate club when faced with a punitive carbon or 
universal tariff. Given that such a tariff would potentially foul of several provisions of the 
WTO trade regime,61 they are far more likely to challenge the minilateral use of 
sanctions. This is precisely what the United States, China and India did when the 
European Union announced its plan to include all international airlines in its regional 
carbon emissions trading scheme.62 It is interesting to note in this context that the 
Montreal Protocol’s system of trade sanctions was never challenged under the GATT or 
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WTO, not least because all major economies agreed to be bound by the environmental 
regime. No such broad-based agreement exists among the major GHG emitters, 
however. Second, the obstacles to successfully negotiating a club agreement with strict 
trade sanctions are particularly high, and it is unlikely that any of the leading emitters, 
with the possible exception of the EU, would be willing to accede to such a demanding 
treaty backed up by punitive sanctions. Indeed, most major powers have traditionally 
resisted strong compliance and enforcement mechanisms in environmental treaties, 
preferring the flexibility that is provided by facilitative compliance approaches.63 Climate 
politics is no exception to this, where the majority of the leading emitters, most notably 
the United States and China but also India, have rejected binding emissions targets that 
can be enforced through international law. The only feasible scenario for an effective 
sanctions regime would be a ‘coalition of the willing’ that share a common interest in 
effective climate action and use sanctions to strengthen their commitments, or a regional 
body that can use already existing mechanisms to punish non-compliant behavior (as is 
the case in the European Union).  
 Finally, a climate club would need to support any mitigation commitment by 
establishing an effective system for reporting, monitoring and verification. This is to 
prevent shirking by members that claim to adhere to club rules but fail to do so in reality. 
This has so far eluded most existing minilateral efforts; most of the existing clubs, such as 
the Asia-Pacific Partnership, were unable to establish a comprehensive system of 
monitoring and verification. And the history of multilateral negotiations suggests that 
major powers are reluctant to subject themselves to strict international monitoring and 
verification obligations in the environmental field. This is not to suggest that this would 
be an unrealistic task, however. Regional clubs can use existing supra-national legal 
systems created within regions (e.g. EU emissions trading scheme), and the on-going 
UNFCCC negotiations have made some progress towards a global system of monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV).  
 In sum, the preceding discussion suggests that while climate clubs may be able to 
make an important, if limited, contribution to global climate policy, they are unlikely to 
do so by altering the incentives of reluctant global players. Clubs will be at their most 
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effective when they are constructed as coalitions of the willing, i.e. small groups of 
countries whose interests are closely aligned around a joint mitigation strategy. In such 
cases, climate clubs help the members to reduce the costs of emission reductions and 
encourage compliance. This can work in regional settings, for example in highly 
integrated regional organizations, such as the EU, or in looser networks of sub-national 
actors that link up their emissions trading schemes, as is the case in North America.64 It is 
also possible that such clubs emerge among countries and other actors whose interests are 
aligned along sectoral lines (e.g. major shipping companies and nations). In both these 
cases, the rationalist theory of club cooperation offers some limited hope for an improved 
regime design as part of a multi-level and poly-centric governance system. However, 
climate clubs are unlikely to be able to win over, let alone coerce, major emitters that are 
reluctant to join the global mitigation effort. In this sense, they are not a “new solution”65 
to the global climate problem. 
 
5. International Legitimacy  
 
A third rationale for climate minilateralism is centred on the notion of legitimacy and 
great power responsibility, and is based on constructivist and English School theories of 
international relations. At its core is the argument that minilateral clubs can remedy 
multilateralism’s legitimacy crisis. Viewing multilateralism as a distinct norm in 
international society that favours international interaction based on rules rather than the 
exercise of power, this perspective is primarily concerned with enhancing 
multilateralism’s effectiveness (output legitimacy) while preserving its procedural fairness 
and inclusiveness (input legitimacy). In the post-1945 era, multilateralism proved to be 
an overwhelmingly successful form of international cooperation that served the interests 
of great powers as well as weaker states. More recently, however, its input and output 
legitimacy have both come under strain. 66  Emerging powers are challenging the 
representativeness of existing international institutions while the established powers, 
chiefly the United States, question the usefulness of multilateral forums as the number of 
members – and veto players – expands. For multilateralism to remain both legitimate and 
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effective, therefore, multilateral institutions and processes need to adapt to the shifting 
power balance and accommodate the demands of the powerful few. As Finnemore has 
argued, “[t]he challenge for multilateralism is, and has always been, to devise rules that 
both accommodate power (so the strong will ‘buy in’) but are accepted by others.”67 In 
this view, minilateralism becomes a tool for re-legitimating multilateralism by giving 
great powers a privileged position in decision-making, while acknowledging their special 
responsibilities in the pursuit of the global common good.68  
 Could the introduction of minilateral cooperation restore the output legitimacy 
of climate multilateralism while retaining a sufficient degree of procedural legitimacy? At 
first sight this seems a paradoxical suggestion. After all, past efforts to shift the climate 
negotiations to other international forums have widely been perceived as a threat to the 
UNFCCC’s standing as the dominant and universally accepted forum for negotiating 
climate policy. Especially US initiatives to create new minilateral institutions, such as the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership and the Major Economies Forum, were originally greeted with 
vehement opposition from within the UNFCCC’s membership.69 Analysts have also 
highlighted the risks of institutional fragmentation and loss of legitimacy if the centrality 
of UNFCCC multilateralism is diluted.70  
 For constructivists and English School theorists, the legitimacy of the climate 
regime rests not solely in the broad acceptance it has gained, based on near-universal 
membership and consensus-based decision-making in a transparent process. It also, and 
critically, depends on the performance of the regime as a regulatory instrument. As 
Eckersley argues, “effectiveness is an important component of legitimacy”, and the 
climate regime’s failure to drive down emissions is therefore eroding its legitimacy as a 
workable international regime.71 In this view, minilateralism offers an opportunity to 
strengthen output legitimacy, by giving great powers certain prerogatives that facilitate 
more effective bargaining and strengthen compliance. At the same time, such climate 
club initiatives would need to be linked to the regime’s multilateral framework if a 
sufficient degree of input legitimacy is to be retained.  
 From its origins in the early 1990s, the UNFCCC regime favoured input over 
output legitimacy, deriving its legitimacy mainly from strong versions of procedural 
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multilateralism and North-South equity. In the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, 
industrialised countries agreed to take on a larger mitigation burden based on the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR), but US contestation of 
the exclusion of large developing countries from emission reduction commitments 
undermined the greater power consensus around the CBDR norm. As emission were 
rising fast in emerging economies, the question of how to re-adjust the distribution of the 
mitigation burden became one of the central points of contention in the post-Kyoto 
negotiations.72 In this context, the purpose of introducing minilateral elements is to 
increase the legitimacy of the climate regime in the eyes of the great powers. By giving 
them a privileged space in which to agree their respective contribution to the global 
collective mitigation effort, their special interests are protected in exchange for an 
acknowledgement of their special responsibilities. At the same time, placing the 
minilateral forum within the UNFCCC regime would ensure that the overall regime 
structure remains legitimate to all countries.  
 Eckersley’s model of a climate club with formal links to the UNFCCC regime is 
the most fully developed proposal of this kind. Eckersley proposes a formally established 
Climate Council composed of major emitters and other countries, with members chosen 
from three categories: “the most capable, the most responsible and the most 
vulnerable”.73 This Climate Council could be as small as eight or as large as 23 and would 
offer a critical mass approach to small-n negotiations, thus aiming for the kind of 
bargaining efficiency gains that rationalists also advocate. It would give climate powers an 
opportunity to pre-negotiate climate mitigation deals that could then be adopted by the 
wider membership of the UNFCCC, but without subjecting this pre-negotiation phase 
to the cumbersome and highly inclusive UNFCCC process. The great powers would be 
in control of the club process but would still need to gain the approval of the members of 
the Climate Council that represent the large majority of developing countries. Eckersley 
is thus explicit in linking any outcomes from club-based cooperation to the multilateral 
framework of the UNFCCC. In her view, whatever the Climate Council agrees would 
not replace multilateralism, but could serve “as a stepping-stone towards a more 
comprehensive treaty”.74 By formally incorporating the club into the existing multilateral 
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regime and making it answerable to the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, 
Eckersley hopes to ensure that the Council would better reflect the underlying power 
balance in climate politics while preventing an erosion of the regime’s overall legitimacy. 
 Is such a construction likely to succeed? Can it adequately reflect power 
asymmetries and grant great power prerogatives while assuring the weaker members of 
the regime that they have not been reduced to bystanders in the climate negotiations? In 
other words, can the introduction of minilateralism into the UNFCCC regime increase 
its output legitimacy, by strengthening the buy-in from major emitters, while ensuring a 
sufficient degree of input legitimacy, particularly with regard to the representation of 
developing countries? We need to consider three key questions in this context. 
 The first question concerns the promise of greater bargaining efficiency. In 
similar fashion to rationalists, the constructivist argument for climate minilateralism rests 
on the assumption that small-n bargaining can lead to faster and more effective results. 
Eckersley, for example, supports the idea of a critical mass approach that enables the core 
group of parties on the Council to reach an agreement first before the remaining 
UNFCCC parties are asked to endorse it.75 However, the same problems that plague the 
rationalist case for small-n negotiations afflict constructivist arguments. Restricting 
bargaining to the major polluters cannot address the structural problem that is posed by 
interest diversity and disincentives to take costly mitigation action. If anything, making 
victims of global warming (mostly developing countries) members of the minilateral 
forum would merely reproduce the political fault-lines that have bedeviled the 
UNFCCC’s multilateral process. Clearly, the attempt to achieve a balanced 
representation in the Climate Council seeks to address input legitimacy concerns, but by 
reducing the exclusivity of the club it makes it even less likely that such small-n 
negotiations could break the deadlock in the bargaining process. It is reasonable to 
expect, therefore, that the conflict between input and output legitimacy cannot be 
entirely resolved. 
 If limits on performance-based legitimacy are the price to pay for enhancing 
representativeness and input legitimacy, then a second question arises: would the 
combined minilateral and multilateral architecture be legitimate in the eyes of the 
	 22 
broader UNFCCC membership? Clearly, having a balanced representation of the main 
culprits and victims of climate change would ensure that developing country voices are at 
least heard inside the club. Whether they would also have veto power over any decisions 
taken by the club depends on its decision-making rules and whether its agreements need 
formal adoption by all parties to the UNFCCC. Past experience suggests that any 
deviation from consensus-based decision-making within the UNFCCC is highly 
controversial and will be resisted by developing countries. The informal practice of using 
small-n gatherings in the climate negotiations, from the ‘Friends of the Chair’ groups to 
the high-level meeting at the end of the Copenhagen Conference, has attracted strong 
criticism at critical junctures in the negotiations. Formalising such minilateral practices 
and making them more representative and transparent would certainly help address some 
of the concerns, but it is difficult to see how minilateral decisions could ever legitimately 
force the hand of the multilateral climate regime.76 Again, we find that the inherent 
conflict between output and input legitimacy is a dilemma that refuses to go away even if 
climate minilateralism is formally integrated into the UNFCCC.   
 The third question takes us back to the initial aim of making the climate regime 
more legitimate in the eyes of the great powers. Can the creation of minilateral decision-
making forums provide adequate great power prerogatives to ensure their buy-in? It is a 
widely-held assumption that minilateralism is indeed the best way to balance power 
asymmetry with multilateral legitimacy. But the experience of post-1945 international 
cooperation shows that great power prerogatives come in many different forms: from 
informal minilateralism (e.g. GATT’s green room) to weighted voting rights (e.g. IMF) 
and the exclusive use of veto power (e.g. UN Security Council). It is the analogy with 
international trade cooperation that usually informs proposals for climate minilateralism. 
The GATT analogy suggests that if the major trading powers were able first to agree 
multilateral trade disciplines informally within small-n negotiations before they were later 
adopted by the entire GATT membership, then something similar should be attempted 
in the climate negotiations. But this analogy overlooks a crucial difference between trade 
and climate cooperation. The great powers have used minilateral talks to structure 
multilateral trade deals in order to pursue their shared interests in advancing the trade 
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liberalisation agenda. In the climate talks, the main (short-term) interest that the great 
powers share is in avoiding costly short-term commitments to emissions reductions, 
whatever the long-term damage they may suffer from global warming. They may have 
come to accept a special responsibility to protect the global climate, but they continue to 
prefer to translate this responsibility into regulatory measures that reflect domestic 
policies rather than internationally agreed targets. With the exception of the European 
Union, all major emitters have come to reject the idea of a legally binding mitigation 
agreement. Thus the main great power prerogative that they demand from the climate 
regime is the ability to set their own level of ambition for reducing emissions, based on 
domestic policy preferences. This, of course, could be achieved in the existing multilateral 
process of the UNFCCC just as much as in a minilateral setting.    
 The central dilemma, then, is that climate minilateralism as an integral part of 
the multilateral UNFCCC framework would not get us closer to a strong and binding 
international agreement on mitigation, but would allow the great powers to shift the 
nature of the climate regime from a top-down towards a bottom-up logic of national 
pledges. The critical point is that major emitters demand flexibility, not exclusive 
decision-making authority, in exchange for great power responsibilities. Such flexibility, 
in the form of voluntary pledges to limit or reduce emissions, is already emerging in the 
existing multilateral framework, as the preparations for the 2015 Paris Conference of the 
Parties demonstrate. Climate minilateralism may play a role in facilitating great power 
dialogue, but it is primarily a change in the objective of the negotiations and the nature 
of any future agreement that would strengthen the climate regime’s legitimacy in the eyes 
of the great powers. Minilateralism as a legitimating strategy would thus merely accelerate 
the existing shift away from a top-down regulatory approach towards a looser bottom-up 
governance system. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Climate minilateralism has received growing scholarly attention in recent years, not least 
because it is now widely recognized that the multilateral climate regime has failed to stem 
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the rise in global greenhouse gas emissions. This signals a decisive shift in the debate on 
how to deal with the global threat of climate change. It parallels similar developments in 
other global policy areas marked by multilateral gridlock, from international trade to 
financial regulation and nuclear non-proliferation. While scholars debate whether and 
how the UNFCCC regime can be reformed, a growing number are engaged in a search 
for alternative approaches to global climate governance. The realization is setting in that 
policy responses to global warming will have to be developed simultaneously at different 
levels of governance, from the local to the regional and global, and involving different 
types and configurations of actors. Within this debate, the idea of climate clubs has 
gained particular prominence as it promises to deal with several of multilateralism’s main 
shortcomings: its cumbersome and slow bargaining process that gives veto power to too 
many players; its inability to create incentives for emission reductions and prevent free-
riding; and its inability to acknowledge, and work with, the reality of power asymmetry 
that is at the heart of the global mitigation challenge.  Could climate clubs be a “new 
solution”77 to the global climate problem? 
 Three conclusions follow from the analysis in this paper. First, when discussing a 
minilateral solution to climate change, we need to recognize that there are at least three 
different types of minilateral logics at work – bargaining efficiency, club benefits, 
international legitimacy – and that they offer different paths towards a global climate 
solution. The size and composition of minilateral forums is intimately tied to the purpose 
that these forums are meant to serve and cannot be discussed independently from it. In 
the case of small-group bargaining forums, minilateralism aims at improving the 
efficiency of the bargaining situation, thereby facilitating agreement on climate 
mitigation among a small group of major emitters without necessarily altering their 
interest calculation. Climate clubs can also be designed to produce excludable club 
benefits or impose sanctions on non-compliant members or non-members. In this case, 
their purpose is to reduce interest diversity and create incentives for countries to join the 
club and abide by its rules. Finally, a climate club may also serve the purpose of 
strengthening the international legitimacy of the climate regime by acknowledging the 
desire of great powers for special power prerogatives while tying their club-based 
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cooperation to the multilateral framework. Our assessment of whether minilateralism 
offers a potential solution must be sensitive to these three different rationales.  
 Second, closer scrutiny of these three logics offers reasons for caution against 
exaggerated hopes that surround some (though not all) climate club proposals. With 
regard to small-n bargaining forums that seek to stimulate dialogue and build trust 
among leading emitters, a change in the bargaining context on its own is unlikely to 
overcome the profound interest diversity and incentives for free-riding. Getting a deal on 
internationally agreed mitigation efforts is less a question of reducing the number of 
players than of the convergence of domestic policy preferences towards strong 
international action. Concerning climate clubs that seek to shift the incentive structure 
towards stronger mitigation efforts, a focus on non-climate objectives such as energy 
efficiency, technological innovation or climate finance may be able to create certain 
excludable club benefits, which in turn can attract members to the club and reduce the 
tendency towards free-riding. But such changes to the incentive structure are unlikely to 
work in the case of large emitters whose interests are not aligned with climate mitigation 
or that lack domestic support for strong international action. Finally, establishing 
minilateral forums would go some way towards better aligning international power 
asymmetries with the objectives of the climate regime. Leading emitters could be given a 
privileged status in the climate regime’s decision-making structure in exchange for 
acceptance of their special climate responsibilities. But this kind of great power privilege 
would not achieve significantly greater buy-in from the more recalcitrant climate powers. 
Their main interest is in gaining greater flexibility in how mitigation policies are designed 
and implemented, not an exclusive right to set binding international targets. It is 
tempting to think that, where collective bargaining among the UNFCCC’s near-
universal membership has failed to reach agreement on international climate action, a 
small group of global powers could cut a deal that would stand a better chance of being 
implemented. But the analysis in this paper shows that we need to be careful in our 
assumptions about what minilateralism can deliver. 
 This is not to say that minilateralism cannot play a role in future global climate 
policy. The third conclusion that follows from the above analysis suggests that certain 
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uses of minilateralism offer a realistic chance of improving global climate governance. 
Minilateral forums create opportunities for high-level political dialogue that helps with 
building trust and exploring areas of potential compromise. If successful, they create 
political momentum that can stimulate progress in multilateral negotiations. The US-
Chinese agreement on emissions reductions, announced in November 2014 after nine 
months of bilateral talks, was widely hailed for strengthening the chances of a successful 
outcome in the 2015 Paris negotiations.78 It is but one recent example of how minilateral 
efforts, whether in the G-20 or the G-2, can inject dynamism into the multilateral 
process.  
Climate clubs can also seek to shift the incentive structure of emitters towards 
greater mitigation efforts, though this is likely to work only for those countries whose 
preferences are already more closely aligned. Such ‘coalitions of the willing’ can choose 
club structures to reinforce their commitment to mitigation policies, lower the costs of 
emission reductions, establish monitoring and verification systems and prevent shirking 
and free-riding. Such coalitions of like-minded actors usually emerge as regional clubs (as 
in the case of the EU) or can be constructed around specific economic interests based on 
sectoral agreements (which may also include corporations). In this way, minilateral clubs 
allow climate leaders to go ahead with their mitigation policies without waiting until 
agreement is reached among all major emitters. Such regional or sectoral climate clubs 
can also become building blocks of a larger climate governance architecture.79  
 Climate clubs, if established as an integral part of the multilateral regime, may 
also help re-legitimate the UNFCCC and its related instruments at a time when major 
emitters increasingly doubt its usefulness and long-term viability. By granting powerful 
states certain privileges as part of an integrated club arrangement, the multilateral regime 
would seek to balance existing power asymmetries with major emitters’ special 
responsibilities. And by formally linking minilateral and multilateral forums, such an 
approach would counter the risk of conflictive fragmentation of climate governance.   
The discussion in this article raises several questions for future research. How can 
minilateral approaches be made to work as part of an increasingly multi-level and 
polycentric climate governance system? How can environmental leaders utilize climate 
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clubs to raise the level of political ambition and encourage other actors to join in 
collective mitigation efforts? Future research will need to focus on the conditions in 
which minilateralism can create club benefits that change states’ preferences and interest 
calculations. This should involve systematically considering and comparing experiences 
with different areas of global policy coordination. It should also lead to more empirical 
investigations of how club benefits alter sectoral or issue-specific interests at the domestic 
level. Research should also be conducted on how to structure the relationship between 
emerging minilateral and existing multilateral regimes, so as to promote integration and 
synergy within an increasingly de-centralised global governance architecture.  
In sum, minilateralism offers no panacea for the ills of climate multilateralism. 
Most critically, climate clubs cannot pressurize or induce reluctant great powers to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions. However, a realistic approach to climate minilateralism, 
focused on coalitions of the willing, holds the promise of moving us beyond the current 
stalemate in international climate negotiations. The rise of minilateralism, often decried 
as a sign of the disintegration of the postwar multilateral order, can be harnessed to 
strengthen an increasingly polycentric field of global governance. It can inject political 
momentum into gridlocked international processes, provide new forms of collective 
leadership in a post-hegemonic world and reconcile existing multilateral regimes with 
shifts in the global power balance. In situations where global public goods are in short 
supply, international society has no choice but to seek innovative approaches to global 
governance. 
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